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Abstract
In this paper I will try to demonstrate why and how a hermeneutical approach, based 
on a more fl exible interpretation of fundamental rights, can be useful to accommo-
date cultural differences and at the same time preserve a societal cohesion around 
basic values. My approach is not alternative, but additional to the more classical poli-
cies based on group rights and on individual rights, and it is a system of legal interpre-
tation somehow similar to the margin of appreciation doctrine, which the European 
Court of Human Rights adopts in its case law to balance the enforcement of rights 
and national traditions. I argue that it should be possible, even within a single state, to 
allow restrictive interpretations of Constitutional principles in a way that limits their 
goals and validity, in order to balance them with the right to cultural identity.
Keywords: pluralism, group rights, multiculturalism, interpretation, margin of appre-
ciation.
Resumo
Neste artigo vou tentar demonstrar por que e como uma abordagem hermenêutica, 
baseada em uma interpretação mais fl exível dos direitos fundamentais, pode ser útil 
para acomodar diferenças culturais e ao mesmo tempo preservar a coesão social em 
torno de valores básicos. A minha abordagem não é alternativa, mas adicional para as 
políticas mais clássicas baseadas em direitos de grupos e em direitos individuais e é 
um sistema de interpretação jurídica em certa medida similar à doutrina da margem 
de apreciação, que a Corte Europeia de Direitos Humanos adota em seus entendi-
mentos para equilibrar a aplicação dos direitos e as tradições nacionais. Sustento que 
deve ser possível, mesmo dentro de um único Estado, permitir interpretações restri-
tivas dos princípios constitucionais de uma forma que limite seus objetivos e validade, 
de modo a equilibrá-los com o direito à identidade cultural.
Palavras-chave: pluralismo, direitos de grupos, multiculturalismo, interpretação, 
margem de apreciação.
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Introduction
In recent years, multiculturalism has been criti-
cized for a long list of reasons, such as for being at 
odds with liberal democracies, for treating cultures in 
a monolithic and essentialist way, for disempowering 
women, for demanding non-existent group or collective 
rights, and fi nally for undermining social cohesion and 
the inhabitants’ sense of belonging. At the same time, 
multicultural policies have faced a sort of practical and 
theoretical retreat, due to the lack of public support, to 
concrete failures of cultural integration in many cases, 
and to an increasing assertiveness of the state in impos-
ing its liberal principles on all inhabitants (Joppke, 2004), 
in the name of what has been called a “cultural-diversity 
skeptical turn” (Vertovec and Wessendorf, 2005). 
The concern for civic integration is increasingly 
overweighting the desire to recognize diverse identi-
ties, and such a widespread fear for social cohesion is 
now determining new forms of political assimilationism 
(Back et al., 2002; Brubaker, 2001; Grillo, 2007). What 
is at stake is the idea that multiculturalism is divisive 
and as such threatens national unity (Schlesinger, 1992). 
The core of this fear, however reasonable  it may be, is 
that diverse societies are at risk since they are unable 
to enforce and protect their internal cohesion. Inter-
nal diversity and internal cohesion are, from that point 
of view, two contradictory dimensions, two facets that 
can hardly be held together (Schaeffer, 2014). Social 
cohesion and social order seem to be better guaran-
teed, from those perspectives, through a framework 
of shared values and shared practices, in other words 
through the strengthening of individual belonging to the 
political community (Barry, 2001).
In the following pages, I will try to demonstrate 
why and how a hermeneutical approach, based on a 
more fl exible interpretation of fundamental rights, can 
be useful to accommodate cultural differences and at 




The fi rst caveat that must be stressed is that 
recognition of ethno-cultural diversity does not mean 
only legal recognition. Even if it is common to think that 
charters of rights are a primary institutional solution to 
the needs of minority groups and to their cultural pres-
ervation, the recognition of group rights or of individual 
rights can fail (I stress this ‘can’) in obtaining what maybe 
counts more, so to say social integration and social ac-
ceptance. In some way, the assumption that recognition 
is necessarily or primarily linked to a certain distribution 
of rights or to a certain application of rights is marked 
by a liberal bias and denies that struggles for recognition 
are not simply motivated by the desire to see practices 
and traditions legally recognized, but by the absence of 
any kind of social recognition. These claims, in other 
words, arise from the need for a different image of self 
and from the undermined self-esteem due to a hostile 
societal and cultural environment (Patrick, 2002).
This is why any policy centred on the recognition 
of rights (both group and individual rights) can lead to 
an overlapping of normative issues and symbolic issues. 
On the contrary, I argue that rights can be an important 
strategy in order to support and strengthen social ac-
ceptance and recognition, but they are a posterius com-
pared to it. Recognition is related to the symbolic and 
requires a deeper change in patterns of interpretation 
and socially shared paradigms for the comprehension 
of social practices. In male-female relationships, in food 
traditions, in child education, in the defi nition of aes-
thetic canons, what allows minorities to practice and 
live their cultural patterns is the social openness that 
exists towards them. This social openness needs a cul-
tural change that consolidates over time, changing tra-
ditional paradigms for the interpretation of these prac-
tices. According to Fraser (2003, p. 13; see also Fraser, 
1997), “The remedy for cultural injustice […] is some 
sort of cultural or symbolic change […] More radically 
still, it could involve the wholesale transformation of 
societal patterns of representation, interpretation, and 
communication in ways that would change everybody’s 
sense of self”. 
At the same time, it is undeniable that any le-
gal system is an expression of a particular form of life 
and of a particular culture, understood in the broadest 
sense of the term, as modes of life, practices, beliefs and 
ideas of a particular community. It is evident that these 
modes of life are refl ected in rules on school programs, 
protection of the linguistic heritage, public holidays, so-
cial practices, and so on. That is the reason why if our 
aim is recognition and social acceptance, we have pri-
marily to look for a policy that bolsters such a social ap-
titude (Pfeffer, 2014) and that at the same time does not 
undermine social cohesion; recognition of specifi c rights 
can be a second step, but should not be the pivotal part 
of such a policy. 
I would like to underline this point: I am arguing 
for a public policy, not generically for a cultural change. 
In other words, I am not merely hoping for a deep cul-
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tural change in the way diverse societies perceive cul-
tures and traditions (that would be amazing, of course), 
but for a legal strategy in order to foster cultural recog-
nition without undermining societal cohesion.
The starting point is the awareness of the fact 
that rights as we normally conceive them are biased due 
to a lack of a trans-cultural view, and it is curious that 
in seeking for an accommodation among cultures we 
lack precisely these trans-cultural aptitudes that should 
instead be crucial. Our understanding of human rights, 
that is of those rights that we should grant to ethno-
cultural groups, is shaped by certain ideas of happiness, 
well-being, autonomy, freedom which are themselves 
culturally formed and cultivated (Parekh, 2006, p. 109). 
Even the most basic concepts such as those of human 
nature, human body, birth and death, rationality are to 
some extent culturally embedded, and different cultures 
appreciate different feelings or emotions, conceive dif-
ferently children’s education and the periodization of 
life, and so on (Parekh, 2006, p. 121). 
I am not arguing that human rights are inconceiv-
able outside western cultures: I simply affi rm that we 
have to fi nd a way, a politically reasonable strategy, to 
deal with such a diversity when we speak about rights, in 
order to foster a trans-cultural understanding (at least 
in a certain measure) of diverse social practices and di-
verse cultural identities.
In order to activate that trans-cultural under-
standing, which is the premise for any policy of integra-
tion in multicultural societies, one promising approach 
is the intercultural dialogue indicated by Parekh. Cul-
tural rights, from his perspective, shall be accompanied 
by a universal or cross-cultural dialogue, since we must 
counter our innate tendency to universalize our own 
values and rise to the necessary level of intellectual ab-
straction (Parekh, 2006, p. 128). Such a dialogue not only 
brings together different cultural traditions, thus ensur-
ing that the values we eventually fi nd are as universal 
is humanly possible, but it also imposes on each party 
the obligation to test their reasons and to see whether 
they are acceptable to members of other cultures. Fur-
thermore, this dialogue “shows respect for other cul-
tures, offers those involved a motive to comply with the 
outcome, and gives the values an additional authority 
derived from democratic validation and a cross-cultural 
global consensus” (Parekh, 2006, p. 128). The most in-
teresting characteristic of that dialogue, however, is that 
it involves human nature and other general values, but 
it is less about different values confl icting with each 
other than about different interpretations of the same 
values. What Parekh points out is that cultural diversity 
is not (or not primarily) about confl icting values, but 
about universal values (even those sanctioned in the 
UN Declaration) that need to be interpreted, priori-
tized, and eventually reconciled, in the light of specifi c 
circumstances of each society. What constitutes a harm 
to human dignity varies in cultures, even if all share the 
idea that human beings have something that we can call 
dignity and that indicates their intrinsic worth; similarly, 
every culture produces mechanisms to protect human 
dignity or human life, but some prefer the language of 
rights enforced by the state, others prefer the language 
of duties, enforced by social conditionings and the moral 
pressure of neighbours.
As Parekh clarifi es (even if he does not complete-
ly answer his question), the political problem is how to 
prevent different groups from engaging in self-serving 
moral reasoning, or in trying to justify internal discrimi-
nations against group members. He only stresses that 
we can ask their spokesmen (but how to fi nd them?) to 
justify their decisions when they appear unacceptable to 
us with a strongly and reasonably compelling defence, 
and that if we are not convinced, we should press them 
to change, thus encouraging a debate within the various 
communities themselves. 
My proposal is based on Parekh’s ideas, and it is 
not alternative, but additional to the more classical poli-
cies based on group rights and on individual rights. This 
third strategy, not yet suffi ciently explored and analyzed, 
is more directly linked to case law and to hermeneutic 
margins that are allowed to Courts, and it is based on 
the idea that legal interpretation is the key for the acti-
vation of a wider trans-cultural understanding of rights. 
From that perspective, I am convinced that in some 
social arenas (family, child education, food traditions, 
immigration...) it would be possible to demarcate sub-
matters and accommodate traditional rules and state 
law through a nuanced system of legal interpretation. 
That system can enforce the integration of the main 
and more defi ned ethno-cultural groups, and it is to be 
placed side by side with other policies, when it is pos-
sible and when other solutions are somehow unfeasible. 
The basic idea is purely hermeneutical: truth or 
human dignity are regulative principles that play the role 
of guiding our search (and our judicial activity) under the 
assumption that we can make mistakes and learn from 
them, in an ongoing process of dialogue and adjustments. 
That idea has been expressed by Popper, as is well-known, 
with the metaphor of a mountain peak that is wrapped in 
clouds; nonetheless, different climbers can try to reach 
it from different ways, and the fact that the peak cannot 
be seen, or that they repeatedly fail, does not discourage 
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them from making additional attempts. Furthermore, the 
climber “may not merely have diffi culties in getting there 
– he may not know when he gets there, because he may 
be unable to distinguish, in the clouds, between the main 
summit and some subsidiary peak. Yet it does not affect 
the objective existence of the summit” (Popper, 2002, 
p. 216). Similarly, according to Finnis (1980, p. 231-233), 
we can therefore distinguish between concepts of rights 
(e.g. of the human right to life, to a fair trial), which can 
be widely shared, and conceptions of those rights, which 
can deeply differ from each other.
We can apply this basic idea to our problem, thus 
understanding how different cultures can have different 
ways to express the same concepts, such as human dig-
nity, gender roles, bodily integrity, etc. At the same time, 
this fact shall not be interpreted from a relativistic per-
spective, as if those concepts did not say anything at 
all. Just as the mountain peak, human dignity does exist, 
even if it can be expressed in different ways and even 
if there are many perspectives from which to observe 
it: it is somewhere, and our cultures indicate different 
paths we can take to reach it. Most importantly, not all 
of these paths are equivalent: some are longer, some are 
shorter, some are harder, and some can fail (and reach a 
secondary peak).
If we start from that assumption, we can under-
stand how rights are generally thought of as universal, 
but by becoming embedded in particular contexts they 
can be affected by some particular qualifi cations and 
sensitivities. This does not mean that rights are always 
relative, but that their minimal meaning (their residuum, 
using Husserl’s words) can give life to diverse maximal 
conceptions of them. From a similar perspective, Mi-
chael Walzer (1994) distinguishes between minimal and 
maximal meanings of moral concepts, between ‘thin’ 
and ‘thick’ accounts of morality; both serve at different 
times and for different purposes, and they can interact 
and work in conjunction.
From that perspective, the system of legal inter-
pretation that I suggest is a mechanism somehow simi-
lar to the margin of appreciation doctrine, which the 
European Court of Human Rights adopts in its case law 
to balance the enforcement of rights and national tra-
ditions (see, among others, Arai-Takahashi, 2001; Mac-
Donald, 1993; for a recent and comprehensive work, see 
Legg, 2012); it is similar to it only in the sense that is 
an interpretative way to balance specifi c traditions and 
sensitivities with universal rights, but it is markedly dif-
ferent in the way it is used and implemented.
In fact, the margin of appreciation doctrine has 
been developed by the European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR) as an interpretational tool, by which the Court 
can distinguish what is properly a matter for each com-
munity to decide at the local level and what is so fun-
damental that the same requirements are imposed on 
every state, regardless of variations in culture. Accord-
ingly, this doctrine works as a tool for balancing different 
understandings of human rights between contracting 
states: in explicitly agreeing to the rights outlined in the 
ECHR, these states are at the same time allowed to in-
terpret this set of rights for their own domestic society. 
The ECtHR remains in the background, as a secondary 
interpreter, checking this deference with a requirement 
of proportionality, banning restrictive interpretations of 
rights that go beyond what is necessary to pursue the 
purpose of the restriction (Arai-Takahashi, 2001, p. 14). 
Besides that, the margin of appreciation’s width varies 
according to the consensus existing within the ECHR 
membership: as the consensus grows, the margin that 
the ECtHR is willing to give shrinks: this is the reason 
why the more states agree on what represents a core 
human value (what the Court is trying to preserve), the 
less is the Court likely to allow any derogation. In such 
a way, consensus is an indicator to defi ne when and to 
what extent a practice has become part of Europe’s 
core rights.
In sum, the ECtHR uses the margin of apprecia-
tion doctrine to accommodate different interpretations 
of rights among states, preserving at the same time what 
it considers the “core” European values, what cannot be 
derogated nor restricted through interpretation.
I argue that it should be possible, even within a 
single state, to allow restrictive interpretations of con-
stitutional principles in a way that limits their goals and 
validity, in order to balance them with the right to cul-
tural identity. Of course, and analogously to the ECtHR 
doctrine, this “culturally sensitive” interpretation cannot 
be too wide: in particular, universal principles cannot be 
limited without justifi cation, and their interpretation 
cannot be such as to abolish them or to determine an 
application incompatible with their nature. Besides this, 
two more caveats shall be considered in order to de-
termine the width of such interpretation: the specifi c 
nature of the rights involved must be taken into account, 
and the existing consensus on the specifi c issue or its 
problematic status shall be considered. Let me explain.
First, in order to disentangle confl icts between 
cultural traditions and national law, it can be useful to 
consider the argument that the ECtHR used to justify 
the margin of appreciation – in Handyside v. UK (Appli-
cation n. 5492/72, Judgment 1976, Dec., 7th). The Court 
recognized that when there is a signifi cant moral plural-
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ism, a state needs to have a margin of appreciation and 
evaluation in the application of the European Conven-
tion principles. 
Similarly, the recognition of the same general 
principle of vertical subsidiarity justifi es the idea that in 
some arenas smaller groups (regions instead of states, 
local authorities instead of regional ones, schools 
boards instead of the National Department of Educa-
tion) are in a better position to interpret and apply the 
same principles, so as to avoid an intolerable contrast 
with local traditions, specifi c circumstances and family 
cultures. In that perspective, this hermeneutic model 
takes into account the fact that contested social arenas 
(such as child education, family law, criminal justice) 
can be internally divided into “sub-matters” (Shachar, 
2001, p. 118), so to say into multiple legal components, 
and allocates interpretative authority along these sub-
matters’ lines. In so doing, when we face a legal dispute 
or a confl ict between traditional rules and general 
principles, we shall necessarily consider all these sub-
matters together, advocating for a more nuanced and 
context-specifi c interpretation. 
Second, the width of this judicial discretion, 
which usually varies according to particular circum-
stances, is to be also related to the specifi c nature of 
rights involved. According to some scholars (Legg, 2012, 
p. 200), and similarly to what has been argued in the 
matter of the margin of appreciation, it is necessary to 
emphasize the difference between absolute rights and 
rights that may be limited. Thus we can arrange on a 
scale absolute rights (life, prohibition of torture), strong 
rights (fair trial, liberty, derogations), qualifi ed rights 
(privacy, freedoms of religion, assembly and speech, and 
non-discrimination) and “weak” rights (property, edu-
cation and free elections), which progressively affect the 
width of the hermeneutical discretion and the amount 
of deference to be accorded to Courts when they have 
to deal with cultural questions. This does mean that 
while absolute rights cannot be limited, other rights 
may be, both by defi ning them and by restricting their 
exercise, for reasons such as the protection of a cultur-
al identity or a minority tradition. 
Of course, that list is highly questionable in the 
sense that one can challenge my choice to consider one 
specifi c right as strong or week. For instance, Donnelly 
distinguishes fully universal rights (such as rights to life, 
liberty and security of the person, protection against 
slavery or inhuman treatments, etc.), more relative rights 
(freedom of conscience, speech and association) and 
rights that “are best viewed as interpretations, subject 
to greater cultural relativity”, such as the right of free 
and full consent of intending spouses (Donnelly, 1984, 
p. 417-418). But what is at stake here is not the status 
of every single right, but the idea that among different 
rights some are stronger than others. This distinction 
simply means that for some rights (which I called strong 
rights) no argument is solid enough to justify any kind 
of limitation, while for other rights (qualifi ed and weak) 
it may be, both by defi ning them and by restricting their 
exercise, for reasons such as the protection of a cultural 
identity or as the diverse meaning that is given to a spe-
cifi c concept, which is implicit in the right.
Third, the width of this margin of interpreta-
tion should be defi ned considering the existence of a 
consensus within the community and within the pub-
lic debate on a specifi c question. More specifi cally, and 
similarly to what is affi rmed by the ECtHR, the width 
of this margin should be inversely proportional to the 
consensus on a particular issue (Benvenisti, 1999); the 
more the Courts are able to identify a wide consensus 
on a debated issue, the less a margin of appreciation can 
be granted to group’s authorities in order to balance, 
in specifi c sub-matters, cultural traditions and general 
rules. In other words, it is possible to say that a margin 
of interpretation should be granted to the extent that 
one can observe a remarkable diversity of moral and 
legal rules about a specifi c issue. 
Two questions are of utmost importance. First, 
it has to be specifi ed how wide can this margin of in-
terpretation be, and second, it has to be clarifi ed who 
could be entitled to evaluate the fairness of that margin 
and its width.
The fi rst question is infl uenced by the two fac-
tors I have already mentioned and by a general principle 
of legal interpretation. The two factors are – as I men-
tioned above – the specifi c nature of the rights involved 
and the existence of a consensus within the community 
on a specifi c question. According to the fi rst factor, only 
with regard to some rights is it possible to argue for a 
margin of cultural interpretation or, in other words, for 
different defi nitions of them as well as for a restriction 
in their exercise. According to the second one, such an 
interpretative discretion is inversely proportional to the 
width of societal consensus on a debated issue. Final-
ly, the general principle to be considered is that such 
a discretion cannot be so strong as to unreasonably 
compress a right, nor to abolish it, nor to determine 
an application incompatible with its very nature; and, 
of course, such a discretion must be justifi ed and sup-
ported by solid arguments. It is impossible to claim a 
different understanding of a right without arguing why it 
would be necessary to protect a specifi c cultural iden-
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tity and why it is notwithstanding consistent with the 
minimal meaning of that right.
In addition to that, other principles can be use-
fully taken from the ECtHR case law in order to clarify 
how this cultural discretion can work in a sub-national 
context and how it can be implemented by national 
Courts. Firstly, the principle of effective protection 
of individual rights requires rights to be interpreted 
broadly and exceptions narrowly (Greer, 2010, p. 6), and 
(secondly) this is linked to a more general principle of 
non-abuse: rights are to be protected either from their 
abuse or from their limitation. Thirdly, a principle of le-
gitimate interpretation can be used by national Courts 
establish some minimal standards in the defi nition of 
constitutional rights, in order to prevent local authori-
ties and institutions from conveniently redefi ning their 
way around their obligations. Fourthly, the principle of 
‘proportionality’ can limit interference in constitutional 
rights to that which is least intrusive in the pursuit of 
cultural recognition (Greer, 2010, p. 6).
The second question is to explain who is entitled 
to such a discretion and who has to control its rightful-
ness. More precisely, the central question is to under-
stand how the protection of rights and the democratic 
pursuit of the common interest can be distributed be-
tween judicial and non-judicial institutions. What I am 
arguing is, in fact, that in specifi c sub-matters and social 
arenas different institutions can claim a margin of inter-
pretation of rights for cultural reasons, and that national 
Courts maintain the task of controlling whether or not 
these interpretations are consistent with the essential 
meaning of rights, legitimate and acceptable. This is, as 
one can see, a system of joint interpretation, where 
some authorities (regions, local institutions, school 
boards, etc…) claim a more or less wide discretion in 
the understanding of rights and others (national Courts) 
control these interpretations and endorse them or not.
Such a system of joined interpretation requires 
a rearrangement of the distinction between the margin 
of appreciation and the exercise of discretionary power. 
The margin of appreciation derives, from a theoretical 
point of view, from the fi nding of indeterminate legal 
concepts (unbestimmte Rechtsbegriffe, in German tradi-
tion), while discretion is the manifestation of a choice, 
that is the exercise of a power. Discretion refers to a lib-
erty of action much wider and deeper than that which 
is required from the margin of appreciation, and it is 
not necessarily linked to the presence of indeterminate 
legal concepts. At the same time, however, discretion is 
often exercised under a strict control by higher institu-
tions and following detailed requirements or options; it 
does not therefore involve interpretation of concepts 
and principles, but rather a choice between methods, 
thus taking specifi c circumstances into account. 
The joint interpretation approach I am arguing 
for is, as a matter of fact, intermediate between the 
two. It does presuppose a specifi c form of contested 
determination of legal concepts, which comes not from 
vagueness, but from the presence of two or more cul-
tural frameworks of reference: legal concepts, in that 
case, are not indeterminate in themselves, but they be-
come indeterminate as long as there are different cul-
tural starting points from which they can be read.
Such a possibility of different determinations of 
legal concepts does justify local institutions’ claims to 
implement rights in ways consistent with specifi c cul-
tural traditions and practices, and it requires national 
Courts to exercise judicial control over such claims. 
The Courts’ task is to control the legitimacy and the 
width of these divergent interpretations of rights: these 
alternatives in understanding rights determine a form 
of discretion, because the subjects who have to imple-
ment rights and rules are confronted with several (ap-
parently) lawful solutions. In fact, we are admitting that 
many solutions can appear to be lawful, each of them 
being consistent with different cultural starting points. 
In such a situation, we can allow some form of discre-
tion in choosing between different lawful possibilities, 
and Courts have to check the legitimacy of the chosen 
one (Barak, 1989, p. 7). 
It is true that, by accepting such a margin of cul-
tural discretion, state’s courts and institutions have to 
abandon a (still deeply rooted) conception of law as 
a unifi ed and hierarchical system of norms, at least in 
part. As a matter of fact, the reality of sub-national re-
lationships between multiple legal orders and of fl uid 
and contested frameworks of social practices has to be 
accepted (Von Benda-Beckmann and Von Benda-Beck-
mann, 2006). Therefore, our systems have to accept the 
fact that many practices can fi nd their legitimate disci-
pline as a result of complex and partially unpredictable 
patterns of interaction and negotiation among rules and 
traditions (Griffi ths, 1986). 
At the same time, the idea that there is a “per-
vasive irreconcilability” between customs and individual 
rights, so as to render their coexistence impossible, is a 
simplistic fi ction (Perry, 2011, p. 29). Many experiences 
prove the existence of a large number of commonalities, 
instead of confl icts, between the basic values that are 
implied in diverse social practices and the importance 
of seeing the intercultural debate as an opportunity to 
develop a more nuanced conception of human rights, 
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which can be consistent with the peculiarities of the 
local context (McDonald, 1988, p. 310, 318). The tension 
between affi rming a universal substantive vision of hu-
man dignity and respecting the diversity and freedom of 
human cultures (Carozza, 2003, p. 40-41) is probably an 
opportunity to build a new understanding of rights, and 
new forms of coexistence, and it should be therefore 
accepted and implemented.
For these reasons, giving space to such an inter-
pretative discretion, with regard to the enforcement of 
rights compared to cultural practices, will be an ongoing 
challenge rather than a solid hermeneutic criterion. Just 
as the margin of appreciation doctrine, this hermeneutic 
balance implies drawing lines between rights and legiti-
mate cultural restrictions, thus weighing controversial 
political and social questions. This is the reason why it 
is impossible to fi nd in advance any precise defi nition 
of what can be done and what cannot; and this is why 
there is no fi xed criterion to determine to what ex-
tent some specifi c rights can be restricted and how. But 
defi nitely single Courts, facing specifi c questions, are in 
a better position than the legislator to decide where to 
set the boundary and to what extent a specifi c practice 
can be allowed, even if it requires a different interpreta-
tion and an alternative understanding of a specifi c right.
Consider the following example about ritual 
bodily mutilations and their confl ict with the constitu-
tional principle of bodily integrity. Recently, for instance, 
a German Court affi rmed that male circumcision shall 
be considered a crime, even when practiced within a 
religious community and on religious grounds. In fact, 
the Court affi rmed that circumcision “is contrary to 
the right of the child who will have to decide later and 
consciously about their religious affi liation” and that 
“the child’s right to physical integrity must prevail over 
the right of parents” in the fi eld of education and reli-
gious freedom. According to my perspective, conversely, 
and without allowing any specifi c individual or group 
right, it would be possible to argue that “bodily integ-
rity” can be understood in different ways, provided that 
such interpretations do not imply a complete denial of 
this concept. In other words, a cultural group could in-
terpret the concept of “integrity” differently from the 
mainstream culture, e.g. by saying that physical integrity 
can be respected not merely when the human body is 
completely and perfectly intact, but also when a small 
and not dangerous mutilation contributes to its “purity”, 
according to the hermeneutic horizon within which the 
ritual practice is exercised. On the contrary, when a mu-
tilation is so intense that it can represent a danger to an 
individual’s health – this is evidently the case of female 
genital mutilations – the margin of interpretation cannot 
be invoked: in these cases injuries are so permanent and 
dangerous that any supposed interpretation of bodily in-
tegrity cannot be consistent with that right, being rather 
a denial of it.
Again, consider the defi nition of “adulthood” and 
the limits to marriage. In many European countries, the 
minimum age for marriage is fi xed at eighteen years 
and can be anticipated to sixteen solely in some cases. 
However, in many cultures, such as the Roma culture, 
an individual can marry even at the age of twelve or 
thirteen. The problem is not only that such marriages 
are not recognized by the state (but this is in fact a 
big issue, particularly in relation with applications for 
family reunifi cation), but also that in many countries if 
a thirteen-year-old girl marries a seventeen-year-old 
boy of the same ethnicity, their sexual acts would be 
considered illegal by criminal law (e.g., Art. 609 quater, 
“Sexual acts with minors”, Italian criminal law). In other 
words, the boy, regularly married according to the Roma 
culture, may be punished with a sentence from fi ve to 
ten years (his behaviour would be deemed rape), even 
with the girl’s consent. The reason is that a minor can-
not dispose of his or her body and their sexual liberty is 
restricted by the law. But the point is: what does adult-
hood mean? I think that it is clearly a cultural question, 
at least in part, and that the moment when the adult 
age begins depends on the cultural framework within 
which one lives. Thus, it could be possible to recognize 
an interpretative discretion to cultural groups in order 
to determine when a person can be considered free 
to decide for himself or for herself, provided that such 
interpretation does not imply a complete denial of this 
concept: e.g., the adult age can never begin before the 
physical development is complete. 
Let me give one more example. If we consider 
the clinical practice, we can observe that all Western 
laws are based on the principle of informed consent 
based on a specifi c conception of personal autonomy: 
to put it simply, the individual is seen as the one who can 
make medical decisions on his or her own behalf. This is 
because Western culture appreciates individual liberty 
and self-determination as the more signifi cant values to 
be taken into account and because illness is interpreted 
both as something that affects exclusively the individual 
body (except for specifi c cases) and as something that 
concerns individual life experience (Fan, 1997; Cheng-
the Tay and Sung Lin, 2001, p. 51). Thus, this model re-
quires medical providers both to give patients all the 
information they need to decide about treatments and 
to respect what patients intelligently and voluntarily de-
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cide: in other words, this principle determines a disclo-
sure of information to patients as wide as possible and 
the need to respect patient’s self-determination about 
treatments to be performed or avoided.
However, people from several cultures do not 
really ask for a complete and autonomous control over 
their medical decision-making. At the same time, rules 
governing conversations between physicians and pa-
tients don’t take into account that, in accordance with 
their culture, some patients want to involve different 
decision-makers, and they ignore the fact that not all 
patients want the same information content in disclo-
sures, and not all information is sought for the purpose 
of medical decision-making (Bowen Matthew, 2008; 
Blackhall et al., 1995). For these reasons, the principle 
of autonomy and individual responsibility, such as that of 
informed consent, should be interpreted as allowing dif-
ferent contents in disclosures and different procedures 
of decision-making: for instance, in order to acknowl-
edge the real infl uence of the cultural context in which 
the patient is embedded, it should be possible to allow 
family-centred decision-making procedures and forms 
of involvement of family groups (Shaibu, 2007; Bonder 
and Martin, 2013, p. 93). In order to address these pe-
culiar perspectives, we need to underline the fact that 
from one and the same concept of autonomy we can 
infer two different conceptions of personal autonomy 
and that one of them can be much more congruent 
with the patient’s culture: for instance, through a more 
communal understanding of individual desires, plans, and 
values, we can conceive them as not independent from 
the relational network within which the person is em-
bedded, but as related to it. Who should be entitled to 
exercise such a discretion in clinical questions? Accord-
ing to the subsidiary principle, it should be exercised by 
local ethical committees. These committees are in the 
best position to appreciate both individual claims and 
the patient’s clinical condition; thus, they are in the best 
position to determine whether and to what extent it 
is possible to bend existing norms and procedures in 
order to respect individual cultural identity. Of course, 
their discretion is under the review of national courts, 
which have to check the legitimacy of the chosen under-
standing of the autonomy principle.
Conclusions
I would like to highlight the most signifi cant as-
pects of my proposal.
First, it is focused on practices, rather than on 
identities. Law, in my perspective, can certainly support 
social acceptance of cultural identities, but its focus is 
on social practices, not on abstract cultural traditions. 
And the nuanced approach that I’m proposing does 
activate a case by case analysis of identity-related prac-
tices and doesn’t intend to evaluate whole cultures or 
entire traditions. 
Second, it is a form of joint interpretation, since 
the state has to accept that individual life can be regulated 
also by traditional rules and in general by a complex and 
overlapping mosaic of rules, which come from multiple 
authorities. In fact, even in cases when it could be inap-
propriate to allow specifi c individual or group rights, such 
a model establishes a judicial mechanism in order to al-
low a trans-cultural understanding of rights, at the same 
time holding fast to the need for a shared framework of 
values within society. In fact, this proposal aims to com-
bine the respect for fundamental rights with the defence 
of a group’s identity by allowing a wider margin of in-
terpretation in the enforcement of constitutional rights. 
Group members or their institutional representative can 
only propose diverse interpretations of constitutional 
rights in order to balance them with the group’s cultural 
identity; but they cannot limit those rights without jus-
tifi cation nor abolish them or determine an application 
incompatible with their minimal meaning.
Third, this perspective does recognize the impor-
tance of the subsidiarity principle: it is only by granting 
a concrete margin of interpretation to group members 
and to their institutional representatives that it is pos-
sible to adequately perform a case by case analysis. In 
that way neither the group nor the state could acquire 
full jurisdiction over matters that affect group members, 
and such co-operation might lead to a greater openness 
to the recognition of specifi c cultural practices. 
Fourth, that approach may be interpreted as a 
judicial mechanism to encourage groups to gradually 
develop their traditions and to update them in accor-
dance with constitutional standards. As a result of the 
consensus parameter, national Courts are able to iden-
tify most problematic issues, thereby stimulating a natu-
ral development of internal rules. At the same time, this 
approach does allow minority groups to maintain their 
own traditions on specifi c issues, but requires them to 
bear a heavier burden of proof before national Courts, 
in order to demonstrate their compatibility with cor-
rect interpretations of constitutional standards.
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